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Introduction 
 
As part of its consideration of the digital economy, the Commission carried out a 
review into online platforms, a group of technologies which includes social media.1 
The Commission noted that the current regime most likely to be applicable to 
platforms2 was the e-Commerce Directive,3 which inter alia provides for neutral 
intermediaries to enjoy under certain conditions immunity from liability for third party 
content, and although it ‘was designed at a time when online platforms did not have 
the characteristics and scale they have today’, it concluded that broad support for its 
basic principles remained. While the Commission acknowledge same problem areas, 
specifically hate speech, there was no plan to revise the e-Commerce Directive and 
the policy narrative that the internet should not (or perhaps could not) be regulated 
looked to continue. That same month, however, the Commission revealed the 
proposal4 for the revision of the Audiovisual Media Services Directive (AVMSD)5 – a 
piece of legislation that had through its revision of the previous Television without 
Frontiers Directive6 caused controversy by extending EU regulation to ‘video-on-
demand services’, the precise meaning of which is still not entirely clear. Included in 
the 2016 Commission proposal to amend the AVMSD was the rather startling 
suggestion to extend regulation to a subset of social media platforms referred to as 
‘videosharing platforms’ (VSPs). Despite some significant opposition from some 
Member States and dissent between MEPs, the proposal was agreed in trilogue, 
with the VSP provisions remaining, albeit in somewhat different form from that 
originally envisaged by the Commission. In this, the AVMSD seems part of a series 
of legislative proposals that deal with platforms in response to a particular topic. 
While leaving the e-Commerce Directive seemingly intact, this approach contributes 
to a fragmented regulatory approach across the sector as a whole. 
 
The purpose of this article is to provide a doctrinal analysis of the VSP provisions, 
specifically a consideration of the services to which they might apply, as well as a 
brief discussion of the measures that are envisaged. The comments are based on 
the version of the Directive agreed in trilogue;7 as reviewed by the lawyer-linguists8 
but the text has yet to be formally approved by the Council and the European 
Parliament. Changes in the text are possible, though it is unlikely they would be 
large. 
 
The comments on these provisions will look in some detail at the wording selected. It 
might be thought that this traditionally black-letter approach would be inconsistent 
with that of EU law, typically described as purposive or teleological. Even accepting 
that its interpretative approach is different from that of the domestic courts here, the 
Court of Justice still will, when interpreting EU law, consider the separate elements 
of a definition individually and in some instances meaning has turned on the use of a 
particular word. The definition of videosharing platform and associated terms often 
track the phraseology of definitions used in relation to audiovisual media services 
and which, in that context, have not (yet) been found to be problematic. While there 
were concerns about how the definition of audiovisual media services might be 
interpreted and applied when the AVMSD was enacted, it is submitted that these 
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uncertainties give rise to fewer difficulties than will arise in relation to the 
videosharing platform provisions. The reason is that the definition of audiovisual 
media services essentially seeks to differentiate mass (professional) media9 from 
user-driven media sharing. The VSP provisions seek to distinguish within this latter 
category between content in different formats, where the platforms used for sharing 
do not necessarily so distinguish. There may simply be more hard boundary cases. 
 
The relevant provisions are found in Article 28a–28b, supported by the recitals (4)–
(6) and (44)–(49). The text as approved in trilogue requires Member States to ensure 
that those providing VSPs take ‘appropriate measures’ to: protect minors from 
harm;10 and ‘the general public’ from content containing incitement to violence or 
hatred based on the protected characteristics listed in Article 21 of the Charter,11 as 
well as from criminal content (incitement to terrorism, child pornography and 
xenophobic speech).12 The content rules in relation to commercial communications 
found in Article 9(1) AVMSD in principle are extended to VSPs.13 Article 28a 
specifies a list of the sorts of measures that might be taken and also encourages co-
regulation and the sharing of best practice. 
 
Definitions and scope 
 
A preliminary question is who is caught by these new rules. The answer to this 
question is dealt with through three new definitions: ‘video-sharing platform 
service’,14 ‘user-generated video’15 and ‘video-sharing platform provider’16. These 
new definitions build on some existing definitions – notably ‘programme’17 and 
‘editorial responsibility’18 although these provisions have been amended too. As the 
definition of video-sharing platform provider is ‘the natural or legal person who 
provides a video-sharing platform service’, matters turn on the meaning of VSP. 
Article 1(1)(aa) states: 
 
‘video-sharing platform service’ means a service as defined by Articles 56 and 
57 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union where the principal 
purpose of the service or of a dissociable section thereof or an essential 
functionality of the service is devoted to providing programmes, usergenerated 
videos, or both, to the general public, for which the video-sharing platform 
provider does not have editorial responsibility, in order to inform, entertain or 
educate, by means of electronic communications networks within the meaning of 
point (a) of Article 2 of Directive 2002/21/EC and the organisation of which is 
determined by the video-sharing platform provider, including by automatic means 
or algorithms in particular by displaying, tagging and sequencing. 
 
The recitals acknowledge that some VSPs may be social media platforms, but clarify 
that social media (a term that is not defined) will fall within the Directive only to the 
extent that they satisfy the definition of VSP. The definition of VSP contains eight 
elements, of varying degrees of complexity: 
 
1. a service within the meaning of the TFEU; 
 
2. lack of editorial responsibility; 
 
3. the organisation of content; 
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4. provision of content; 
 
5. principal purpose of the service; 
 
6. general public; 
 
7. content type; and 
 
8. the service is made available over an electronic communications network. 
 
It would seem that these elements must all be present to satisfy the definition, as is 
indeed the case for the definitions relating to the services already within ambit of the 
Directive. 
 
The first element may be relatively non-contentious. It is the same starting point as 
for ‘audiovisual media services’.19 Recital (6) notes that the definition of a 
video-sharing platform service ‘should not cover non-economic activities, such 
as the provision of audiovisual content on private websites and non-commercial 
communities of interest’. Note, however, that the impact of including ‘user 
generated content’ may mean that content elements which may not usually 
satisfy the requirement of being an economic service – that is normally 
provided for remuneration – needed to fall within EU law in general,20 and 
Articles 56 and 57 TFEU in particular, could nonetheless indirectly be regulated 
by the Directive which addresses the sites on which such content is found and 
requires them to take action in relation to certain content found there. It should 
also be noted that the Court of Justice has historically taken a broad approach 
to the finding of such remuneration; notably free content that is supported by 
advertising revenue will be deemed to satisfy this economic element. It seems 
likely that this reasoning would apply to many internet services,21 as well as 
some ‘amateur’ content providers who receive remuneration because of the 
number of page views or because they sponsor particular products and 
services. It has been noted that ‘[t]he fact that new ways of monetising private 
content have appeared makes this distinction between commercial and private 
content even more unclear’.22 
 
‘Editorial responsibility’ is another defined term in the Directive.23 It requires the 
service provider to have control over the content in terms of the selection of 
programmes to be broadcast or made available. Editorial responsibility does not 
concern decisions about the content in relation to individual programmes. This 
follows from the reference to ‘organisation’ of content. Essentially it relates to the 
decision of what goes in a channel, but would not seem to cover the bundling of 
channels together – and certainly under the original AVMSD the recitals made it 
clear that mere transmission was not sufficient.24 Having this aspect of control is a 
key element to the finding that a person is a responsible service provider in respect 
of an audiovisual media service. With the definition of VSP, what is important is that 
the service provider has no such responsibility in relation to the content provided via 
the platform; presumably the negative possibility of taking content down is not 
sufficient to constitute editorial control.25 In practice, it may be that the key 
importance of this element is in distinguishing between audiovisual media services 
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and video sharing platforms. It is impossible for the same service to satisfy both 
definitions; they are mutually exclusive groups. The fact of not having editorial 
control would not be that useful in terms of distinguishing between video sharing 
platforms and other ‘information society services’26 as they none of them would have 
editorial control. 
 
The definition of VSP requires that the provider determines the organisation of the 
content, and gives a non-exhaustive list of the means which may be employed so to 
do: by automatic means or algorithms in particular by displaying, tagging and 
sequencing. It is the ability to organise content that justifies the imposition of 
obligations to protect users from harmful illegal content.27 While this might seem 
straightforward, it should be noted that on-demand and broadcast audiovisual media 
providers are also required to organise content – via a catalogue or schedule 
respectively. In the case of these audiovisual media service providers, however, this 
fact of organising content is relevant to the question of editorial control. It could then 
be suggested that the difference between the two types of service is not organisation 
per se but rather goes to the fact that audiovisual media services providers need 
also to have control over selection. There may come a point, however, where 
selection becomes less important than prioritisation or prominence. At this point, 
selection starts to blend into organisation. 
 
As regards the description of the service that a VSP provider provides, there were 
changes in the text of the Commission’s proposal from both the Council and the 
Parliament. The original Commission proposal referred to the ‘storage’ of a ‘large 
amount’ of content; similar language was also found in the Commission’s proposal 
for a new copyright Directive.28 This raises the question of the extent to which the 
two Directives – aimed at different objectives – were intended to have common 
interpretive elements. The Council amendments to the AVMSD proposal sought to 
remove the phrase ‘large amount of’, while the European Parliament suggested that 
the activity was not ‘storage’ but the ‘making available’ of such videos ‘to the general 
public’, phraseology which again recalls the copyright regime. This change was not, 
however, accepted. It seems that the Council’s concern was to make it clear that live 
streaming sites did not fall within the AVMSD and might be regulated under national 
rules, as can been seen in Council proposed recital 29a.29 In the end, the Council 
abandoned this position, seemingly accepting that live streaming does fall within 
scope of the revised AVMSD. The removal of the term ‘storage’ does have the 
advantage that we do not have to face the question of whether sites with auto-
destruct functions (eg Snapchat) satisfied the definition. The compromise reached 
refers to the ‘providing of’ content, phraseology that reflects the wording in relation to 
the definition of audiovisual media services. What, however, does ‘providing’ in the 
context of VSPs mean? Does it mean that the content is hosted on the video-sharing 
platform – returning us to the issue of storage – or does it include indirect access, 
notably via the use of links? It may be that this broader interpretation is intended: the 
recital specifies that VSPs provide access to the audiovisual content.30 
 
The definition of VSP also specifies that the service should provide audiovisual 
content in order to inform, entertain or educate. This phrasing tracks the definition of 
audiovisual media service.31 When the amendments introducing the original AVMSD 
were enacted, this element of the definition was somewhat unclear: what would a 
service look like that was not intended to inform, entertain or educate? There was 
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some suggestion that the intention was to exclude audiovisual material that had no 
editorial element – such as traffic cams32 – but other commentators took the view 
that this elements were ‘so vague and general that they can apply to virtually any 
type of audiovisual content’33 In the recent Peugot decision,34 the Court of Justice 
held that a YouTube channel comprising promotional videos could not be said to 
inform, entertain or educate because of this promotional purpose; and that the 
videos themselves could not be considered programmes or commercial 
communications within the meaning of the AVMSD. The ruling did not extend to the 
consideration of YouTube’s role, as it was determined under the 2007 version of the 
AVMSD. Is the consequence of this ruling that commercial channels/accounts do not 
count for assessing the principal purpose of a VSP? 
 
Determination of the platform’s principal purpose – that is the service it provides – is 
central to finding whether the platform is subject to regulation. The are two 
approaches: 
 
 principal purpose; and 
 
 essential functionality. 
 
There is no guidance as to how to assess ‘principal purpose’, though we can 
presumably assume a similar approach to principal purpose adopted in relation to 
audiovisual media services. In this there has been some difference in approach 
between the relevant national regulators as to whether a quantitative approach (as 
taken for example by OFCOM) or a more qualitative approach looking to the 
perception of the audience.35 It is submitted that the reality lies somewhere in 
between, when considering how to unify a textual interpretation with the practical 
question of evidence. Principal means ‘most important’. This is not necessarily a 
quantitative assessment about the amount of each type of content on a particular 
VSP; certainly it is unlikely that ‘principal’ should be equated to ‘most’ or ‘the 
majority’. Nonetheless, it is likely that such numbers would give some sort of insight 
into the relative importance of various types of content. 
 
‘Purpose’ might suggest that there is a subject element to the test, but it is more 
likely that this element would be assessed by reference to how the service is used 
not how the operators thought it would be used. 
 
‘Principal purpose’ can be sub-divided into: 
 
 situations where the principal purpose of the entire platform is the provision of 
relevant content; or 
 
 where the principal purpose of a dissociable part of the platform service is the 
provision of relevant content. 
 
In the latter situation, only that section of the platform is covered by the video sharing 
platform provisions.36 This idea of a dissociable part again parallels the approach 
taken with regard to determining whether a website could fall within the definition of 
audiovisual media services37 which is derived from the approach of the Court of 
Justice in New Media Online38 to determining whether a video section on a 
6 
 
newspaper website could be considered an audiovisual media service. In the case 
before the court, it could; significantly, the videos were found in a separate, stand-
alone element of the website and most were not linked to the news stories. They 
were then deemed to fall within the regulatory scope of the Directive. This reasoning 
has been imported in to the recitals of the revised AVMSD.39 From this, it seems as 
though a dissociable element is a consideration of the structure of the site. In most 
social media platforms, however, the ability to post/share videos is integrated with 
the other types of content from the perspective of the user (even if the service 
provider stores different types of file in different locations/ files and/or allows a user 
to search by file type); this might suggest that they are not dissociable in the New 
Media Online sense. Such a finding would mean the question determining the 
applicability of the regime is whether the principal purpose of the site as a whole is 
video sharing. Assuming some form of quantitative assessment of ‘principal 
purpose’, such an integrated platform would seem to have a greater chance of falling 
outside the regime than one where there is a clear dissociable element. 
 
The relationship between the two options is unclear.40 Do we start with the question 
of whether the principal purpose of the platform overall is video-sharing and only 
consider the question of dissociable element if the answer to the first question is no? 
This point could lead to different regulatory results where elements of a service seem 
distinct but where the video is dominant (eg a comments section in addition to video 
as on Vimeo, Dronestagr.am, YouTube or Musical.ly). If we accept the approach 
suggested, the principal purpose of the platform would be provision of video and 
therefore the platform as a whole and not just the video elements would fall within 
the scope of the regime. If we do not, it could be argued that the dissociable non-
video elements fall outside the regime. 
 
The ‘essential functionality’ test seems to be a mechanism for identifying aspects of 
social media services that while not principally aimed at providing 
videos/programmes have that functionality as an important part of the service. It is 
unclear what ‘essential functionality’ requires and whether it is a qualitative or 
quantitative assessment. The recitals specify that such functionality should not be 
‘merely ancillary to’ or ‘a minor part of the activities of that social media provider’.41 Is 
the concern here about the need to provide a functionality, even if that functionality is 
not often used? In these instances the text of Article 1(1)(aa) does not envisage that 
the platform be providing a severable service; it could be argued that a service which 
has video as an essential functionality falls wholly within the videosharing platform 
provisions. Again, the question of relationships unclear; do we only turn to essential 
functionality if neither of the ‘principal purpose’ tests bite? To say otherwise could 
return a dissociable non-video element to the regulatory scope of the VSP 
provisions. 
 
The revised AVMSD acknowledges that this boundary may be difficult to understand 
from the text of the Directive; the recitals envisage that the Commission (after 
consulting the Contact Committee) will develop and publish guidelines on this 
particular point.42 In terms of general approach, in the context of the AVMSD, the 
court has interpreted the definitions with the result that the most impactful regulatory 
burden falls on the service.43 Even so, note that under Article 28b, VSP are obliged 
to take measures in relation to audiovisual content only. 
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Content on VSPs is provided to ‘the general public’, as are audiovisual media 
services.44 The objective of this requirement is presumably the same in both 
definitions – that is, to exclude private communications45 – for example to draw the 
line between Facebook and WhatsApp (which also allows group interactions). There 
is no definition of ‘the general public’. Valcke and Ausloos suggest in the context of 
audiovisual media services that there is a question as to whether this is requirement 
about the intent of the provider or whether this is a numerical assessment of actual 
users.46 They argue that the services are available to the general public when they 
are available to anyone who wants to access the service under the generally 
applicable terms and conditions. The intentional element relates to the question of 
whether a service is targeted at specific groups (for example content aimed at 
travellers in relation to closed circuit broadcasting). This aspect proved difficult in the 
context of non-linear services and it is hard to see how it might apply to services on 
the open internet; this reasoning would however clarify that video-sharing on a 
university virtual learning environment which was limited to registered students 
should not be caught. 
 
Other commentators47 have suggested that we turn to other definitions of the phrase 
for assistance. In the context of copyright and television broadcasts, the court has 
defined the ‘transmission of television programmes intended for reception by the 
public’ as being to ‘an indeterminate number of potential television viewers, to whom 
the same images are transmitted simultaneously’.48 While this has a distinct 
technology specific element, it has been suggested that it would be possible to take 
the central notion of ‘indeterminate number’ of potential users as a starting point. The 
court clarified that this means ‘to ‘persons in general’, that is, not restricted to specific 
individuals belonging to a private group’.49 Looking at the copyright case law this 
indeterminate number has been found in the context of a pub, café-restaurant, hotel 
or spa establishment (there are no bars to entry even though the whole world cannot 
be there)50 and in the context of the internet in GS Media,51 but not in the context of 
a dentist’s surgery (because of the small number which is an identifiable group – 
patients- who are not mainly at the dentists for the music).52 In Reha Training53 a 
rehabilitation centre’s clientele was nonetheless held to constitute the ‘public’ despite 
the fact that people on the premises would be a reasonably small group of rehab 
patients. From these cases we see that in addition to indeterminacy of the group, the 
number of (potential) members should not be insignificant – though in many of these 
instances a restricted user group was accepted as constituting the public. It seems 
that ‘public’ is quite a low threshold to cross; a university learning environment used 
for video-sharing might not be excluded on this basis. In assessing these factors, it is 
the possibility of access and not the fact of whether users availed themselves of that 
possibility that is important; the fact that a user might have to pay for access does 
not seem to be a relevant criterion.54 
 
This concept of the public seems be used in relation to a number of (copyright) 
Directives, giving coherence to EU law.55 This supports the argument that the 
concepts could be carried across to this content. A note of caution should, however, 
be expressed in relation to relying on the copyright jurisprudence without reflection: 
at least some of the cases were decided in the light of the purposes of the 
Information Society Directive, which include the establishment of a high level of 
protection for authors, and so the term ‘public’ should be understood broadly.56 
Whether such a broad understanding of the term is appropriate in the VSP context, 
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is another matter. Second, this case law relates to ‘the public’ rather than the 
‘general public’; does this adjective have the effect of excluding services used by 
(some) restricted groups from the Directive’s ambit? 
 
One question relates to whether we assess ‘general public’ by reference to those 
who post content (ie members) or those to whom the content is accessible and does 
not arise in relation to audiovisual media services given that in relation to both linear 
and non-linear services, the service provider is the only entity that provides content. 
The concern relating to audiovisual services focuses in both linear and non-linear 
services is the impact that such services have on the viewers.57 The same reason 
justifying regulation is given in relation to VSPs58 which could suggest that the 
general public is those who view, not those who post. This then would turn into a 
question of whether platforms allow content to be visible to non-members or not. In 
relation to sites which do not allow non-members to see content may depend on how 
many members there are (Facebook, or Instagram for example, might still be the 
general public even if non-members cannot see content given the size of the 
platform) and how open the site is to new members. Some sites have more stringent 
application processes, though while some might state they are invitation only (which 
could be a completely closed community), in practice most allow noneinvitees after 
vetting or after a trial membership.59 Whether selection based on characteristics 
(such as wealth or age60) means that the population group is not sufficiently general 
it not known; wealth is not an inherent characteristic but – depending on how wealthy 
members would be required to be – could relate to a small group. Age cannot be 
changed by an individual, but potentially the groups are large. These limitations are 
set at platform level; it seems unlikely that a system that allows the establishment of 
a sub-group (by members) within a larger framework would be sufficient to remove 
that platform from the definition; the regulation bites at the platform level, not at the 
sub-group. 
 
The Commission proposal referred to ‘content’ but following amendments from the 
Council, the revised Directive’s text refers to programmes and user-generated video. 
Both are defined terms. Note at this point that commercial communications are not 
included. If the platform only or principally provides commercial communications it 
would therefore seem to fall outside the definition; the possible impact of the Peugot 
judgment has been noted above. While the text includes the phrase ‘devoted to 
providing programmes, user generated videos, or both’ does ‘devoted’ imply that the 
content must fall exclusively within this category? Note that the word ‘devoted’ is also 
used in the definition of audiovisual media services and has not been given such a 
restricted connotation.61 Further, a broader interpretation is supported by recital (46) 
which accepts that VSPs carry commercial communications. Even if a narrow 
interpretation were to be adopted, the initial stringency of this requirement would 
seemed to be mitigated by the fact that this purpose need be only the principal 
purpose of the platform not its exclusive purpose. 
 
The first category of content identified is that of ‘programmes’ defined in Article 
1(1)(b). This is a definition that was inserted into the Directive during the previous 
round of revisions and was primarily intended to play an important part in delimiting 
the scope of regulated services. Problematically some of the wording included to tie 
programme to audiovisual media service provider, specifically the phrase ‘within a 
schedule or a catalogue established by a media service provider’,62 has not been 
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drafted to reflect the fact that it is now not just audiovisual media service providers 
which may provide content of the type described by ‘programmes’, which lists a 
range of genres. This phrase originally had the effect of clarifying that it was not the 
programme itself that was the subject of regulation,63 a point that could equally be 
made as regards content on VSPs. Given VSPs and audiovisual media service 
providers are mutually exclusive, however, the retention of this phrase means that 
programmes as defined in Article 1(1)(b) can never be provided by a VSP as they 
must be provided by an audiovisual media service provider. Of course, audiovisual 
service providers may use VSPs to disseminate their content. Nevertheless, the 
mechanism envisaged for the framing of the content – ‘schedule’ and ‘catalogue’ – 
do not fit well with the techniques of organisation identified for use by VSPs- 
displaying, tagging and sequencing. This could just be an unfortunate blip – to be 
minimised by teleological interpretation – or it could mean that programmes in 
relation to VSPs are different from programmes found on audiovisual media 
services. It would seem that their essential characteristics, as understood by the 
Court of Justice – that is their form (ie audiovisual); their audience (a mass 
audience64) and their impact on that audience,65 could be the same. 
 
The definition of ‘user-generated video’ (added to the AVMSD as (1)(ba)) runs as 
follows: 
 
a set of moving images with or without sound constituting an individual item, 
irrespective of its length, that is created by a user and uploaded to a video-
sharing platform by that user or any other user. 
 
At first glance, this looks clear enough. There are parallels here with the limitations 
found in relation to audiovisual media services – that is the limitation to moving 
images. Silent films could fall within this definition but radio66 (or analogous services) 
would not be caught. Online editions of newspapers also fall outside the scope of the 
Directive (though what this means is somewhat unclear as we shall see below). The 
recitals to the revised Directive provide that ‘[v]ideo clips embedded in editorial 
content of electronic versions of newspapers and magazines and animated images 
such as GIFS should not be covered by this Directive’.67 This exclusion for GIFs is 
unusual because it is expressly not technology neutral; GIF means graphics 
interchange format. It also raises the question of where the boundary between an 
animated GIF (or a series of them) and a very short cartoon lies,68 especially since 
New Media Online suggests that length is not determinative – at least in relation to 
audiovisual media. Presumably a social media platform which allowed users to share 
photographs69 would not fall within the definition; nor a platform that was text-based 
(or text plus photographs), such as Mumsnet.70 
 
A further question concerns the meaning of ‘user’. There is no definition of and 
therefore no limitation on who can be a user. A user would probably be defined 
functionally as anyone (legal or natural person) who uses the service. While the 
content does not need to be uploaded by its creator but can be uploaded by a 
different user, the phrase ‘created by a user and uploaded to a video-sharing 
platform by that user or any other user’ suggests that both users must be users of 
the same platform (unless ‘user’ is taken to mean user of anything, which seems 
unlikely), potentially excluding cross platform re-postings. This broad definition may 
allow some content that could be categorised as a programme within audiovisual 
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media service to be categorised as usergenerated video in the context of VSPs 
(provided the creator was a user). Conversely, the fact that the creator must be a 
user to satisfy the definition of user-generated video means that unless the creator is 
a user of pirate video sharing sites, which is unlikely, then platforms specialising in 
sharing pirated content (specifically that of a type constituting a programme) would 
not fall within the definition.71 
 
Another question relates to the scope of creation; creation does not necessarily 
require artistic intent but would the clips of, for example, dashcam footage, taken 
automatically, satisfy this requirement? Such content was assumed not to fall into 
the scope of audiovisual content. Presumably we can suggest that creation also 
covers the situation where a user has edited or amended existing content. The issue 
of on-line games (for example Twitch,72 where gamers stream their play via this 
platform) raises further questions about co-creation. In many instances, the gamer 
players in a digital environment created by the games company; in that sense the 
gamer/user did not create the content. The gamer/user would, however, create the 
content that is the particular instance of game play, albeit against a backdrop 
provided by the third party. Could it be argued that this is enough to trigger the 
application of the VSP rules? 
 
The requirement that the service be provided across an electronic communications 
network should not give rise to many problems. It is a reference to the wide range of 
transmission services caught by the EU telecommunications regime, which would 
include cable, satellite and wireless systems (eg mobile, wifi) and is designed to 
exclude content distribution via physical items such as DVDs. 
 
Obligations of VSP providers 
 
The substantive rules are found in Article 28b, with Article 28a dealing with 
jurisdictional issues relating to group companies. It seems that the intention is that 
only the rules in this section should apply to VSPs and not the provisions in the 
Directive generally. The Commission’s proposal required Member States to put an 
obligation on VSP providers to take ‘appropriate measures’ to protect two groups of 
people from two groups of harms reflecting the concerns in relation to audiovisual 
media services: protection of minors; and prohibition on hate speech. From the 
Commission’s initiatives with social media companies to establish a Code of Conduct 
countering hate speech,73 it may be inferred that the driver here is concern about 
hate speech although the need to protect minors remains a live issue.74 The original 
proposal contained in its second paragraph an exhaustive list of the sorts of 
measures that could be required. A third paragraph specified that Member States 
were to ‘encourage’ co-regulation with the appropriateness of the measures being 
assessed by the national independent regulatory authority. Significantly, Member 
States were precluded from imposing stricter measures, save with respect to illegal 
content. These conditions were expressed to be without prejudice to Articles 14 and 
15 of the e-Commerce Directive. The agreed revised version has moved significantly 
from this approach. The provision which would have made part of the revised 
AVMSD (including Art 28b) a total harmonisation measure is no more. Thus the 
entire Directive retains a minimum harmonisation approach, though different 
provisions apply to the AVMSD rules from those applicable to VSPs (see Art 28b(6)). 
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There is an extended list of harms against which measures should be taken. Further, 
Article 28b(3) is no longer expressed as an exhaustive list. 
 
A preliminary point to note is that the VSP provisions seemed to be intended to be 
separate from the rest of the Directive and that the general rules applicable to 
audiovisual media services do not apply to VSPs. One of the rules not so applying is 
the rule setting down the principle of free movement – that is the requirement on 
Member States to ensure freedom of reception and not to restrict retransmission.75 
Presumably, it was thought unnecessary to state this principle because the VSP 
providers, being information society service providers, would otherwise be governed 
by the e-Commerce Directive, as recognised in recital (44) revised AVMSD; that free 
movement obligation is expressed to apply in relation to the field coordinated76 by 
that Directive – not the AVMSD in relation to audiovisual media services.77 
Essentially the rules in Article 28a and 28b ‘overhang’ the terrain occupied by the e-
Commerce Directive leaving anything not expressly dealt with to be considered 
under the e-Commerce Directive. The obvious, arguably ‘better’ solution, of 
amending the e-Commerce Directive was excluded by the Platforms 
Communication; presumably there was a concern that it was unnecessary or 
undesirable to impose these obligations across the sector as a whole. Article 4(8) 
revised AVMSD specifies that the e-Commerce Directive ‘shall apply unless 
otherwise provided for in this Directive’, and is a provision that was found in the 
original AVMSD.78 There are two points of uncertainty with regard to Article 4(8). 
 
First, it is unclear whether the intention is that an AVMSD rule on a topic would 
displace a rule in the e-Commerce Directive on the same topic entirely, or whether 
this provision means that such a rule could continue to apply until its content 
trespasses on the terrain expressly covered by the provision in the AVMSD. The 
provision also provides for a conflict resolution rule whereby the revised AVMSD 
trumps the e-Commerce Directive unless the revised AVMSD provides otherwise. 
This latter rule makes sense because otherwise the more general set of rules (in the 
e-Commerce Directive) could undermine the more specific AVMSD. For this rule to 
trigger it may be that the conflict could arise as a result of the interpretation of the 
revised AVMSD. Conversely, it seems likely that the specification of the priority of 
the e-Commerce Directive would need to be express. 
 
Second, this conflict rule is located in the part of the Directive devoted to audiovisual 
media services Directive; the VSP provisions are in a separate chapter. This context 
could be therefore be taken as implying that the provision does not relate to the VSP 
provisions. The text is ambiguous. While Article 4 in general concerns Member 
States’ ability to impose stricter standards on AVM service providers (and there is a 
separate specific provision doing the same for VSP service providers at Art 28b(6)), 
the text of the specific paragraph containing the conflict rule, Article 4(8), is not 
expressed to be limited audiovisual media services. Although the conflict rule was 
first introduced to deal with possible conflicts in relation to non-linear services (which 
also satisfy the definition of information society services), the main place where 
conflict between the two Directives is likely is in relation to the VSP provisions. 
 
Article 28b(1) identifies the public interest objectives in respect of which Member 
States are obliged to ensure VSP providers take appropriate measures. It is highly 
unlikely that this constitutes a complete coverage of the field, specifically in terms of 
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the obligations that Member States may impose on those operators established in 
their own territories.79 Within the context of audiovisual media, the court has 
recognised that advertising and consumer protection matters are not exhaustively 
dealt with by the Directive,80 a point that is recognised in the recitals. Moreover, the 
court has held that public policy issues are not fully harmonised81 and it seems that 
some issues – media plurality – are not dealt with either.82 Insofar as the scope of 
the eCommerce Directive is concerned, the harmonised field is broader covering, for 
example, civil defamation rules.83 The main purpose of the e-Commerce Directive is, 
however, different from the AVMSD in that it does not require Member States to set 
down specific rules but instead institutes a framework within which Member States’ 
own policy choices operate. The exceptions from the free movement principle found 
in Article 3(4) of the e-Commerce Directive would also be relevant here. This is a 
broader list that found in relation to audiovisual media services including crime 
investigation and prosecution, protection of investors and consumers, public 
security.84 In sum, Member States could be free to take measures in fields not listed 
in Article 28b(1) and while they could not impose them on operators established in 
other Member States (on establishment see Art 28a below), there is still some 
possibility for derogation by reference to the grounds listed in the e-Commerce 
Directive. 
 
There are three themes running through the three categories in respect of which 
Member States must take action. First, the listing of the varieties of content triggering 
the obligations, all of which are audiovisual, suggests that those obligations do not 
apply to any other types of content (text, still image) found on the relevant service. 
Second, none of the defined terms listed expressly requires the relevant content 
caught by the definition to be generally available; that requirement applies to the 
underpinning VSP service. Does this mean that VSP providers should take 
measures in relation to content shared in closed groups? Third, although recital (45) 
emphasises that measures taken should relate to the organisation of content (ie the 
underlying systems) ‘not to the content as such’, action is to be taken in relation to 
threats from the content carried not threats arising from the system itself. For 
example, were the addictive nature of system design itself to be proven, it would not 
seem to fall within the threats addressed by Article 28b(1). Further, the threats may 
emanate from audiovisual commercial communications as well as from ‘user-
generated videos’ and ‘programmes’. It is unclear how this obligation in relation to 
commercial communications found in Article 28b(1) relates to the obligation in Article 
28b(2) to ensure that VSP providers comply with the rules on commercial 
communications found in Article 9(1) revised AVMSD. Presumably other forms of 
threat are envisaged, though Article 9(1) inter alia prohibits communications that 
prejudice respect for human dignity, include or promote discrimination on the basis of 
protected characteristics and requires that such communications should not cause 
physical, mental or moral detriment to minors. As specifically recognised by recital 
(46) to the revised AVMSD, this relationship must, in any event, be understood 
against the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive85 and other pieces of consumer 
protection legislation,86 especially given the recognition that the AVMSD does not 
fully harmonise this field.87 
 
The first category of content to be tackled is that which ‘may impair [minors’] 
physical, mental or moral development’.88 This reflects the similar obligations applied 
to both linear services as well as video on demand and which can now be found at 
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Article 6a revised AVMSD. Consequently, this phrase should be interpreted in line 
with those provisions. The text of the provision – by contrast to earlier analogous 
provisions in TWFD – gives no information as to the type of content that would be 
caught. Despite the change in wording the former provisions offer a starting point. 
So, though violent pornography (as understood in each of the Member States’ own 
legal systems), violence – especially extreme or gratuitous violence, would probably 
be included. Article 6a(1) describes ‘gratuitous violence and pornography’ as the 
most harmful content suggesting, something less than this would still be harmful. 
Gratuitous suggests context should be taken into account, so that – for example – 
war reporting might not fall within this prohibition; it is unclear whether the re-posting 
of violent clips with the disingenuous comment ‘I don’t think this should happen’ 
would be saved by this reasoning. ‘Gratuitous’ appears to qualify only ‘violence’ and 
not pornography. In relation to the analogous provisions relating to audiovisual 
media service providers, these two categories are not viewed as constituting an 
exhaustive list of harmful content. Further, it has been recognised that there is 
considerable different of opinion between the Member States as to what constitutes 
problematic content; furthermore there is little standardisation as to the age of 
protection for minors. Note also the level of harm required: the content needs only to 
be found to impair such development. Previously, services were required to seriously 
impair minors’ development, so standardising across all services at this lower 
standard constitutes somewhat of a shift in protection. 
 
Article 28b(1)(a) specifies that the protection from developmental harm should be ‘in 
accordance with Article 6a(1)’, the provision that deals with protection of minors in 
regards to audiovisual media services. It is unclear what this requirement means. It 
could suggest that the type of content affected is the same for both Article 28b(1)(a) 
and Article 6a(1). Article 6a(1) specifies that such content may be made available 
only ‘in such a way as to ensure that minors will not normally hear or see them’, thus 
providing a base level for the meaning of effective protection. Moreover, Article 6a(1) 
also specifies that the most harmful content is to be subject to the strictest 
measures, though what this obligation requires beyond not letting them be 
accessible, which is the obligation in relation to content that is less than the most 
harmful, is hard to envisage. 
 
The next two categories of content require protection of adults as well as minors. 
The scope of the obligation is to the ‘general public’ – presumably this is everyone 
within a Member State’s territory and not implying any extra-territorial obligation to 
protect. There is a similarity between the prohibition found in Article 28b(1)(b) and 
that found in Article 6(1)(ab) in relation to protection from content inciting violence or 
hatred. The categories of protected characteristics in relation to incitement to hatred 
have been expanded and now track Article 21 of the EU Charter setting out the 
prohibition on discrimination. The characteristics are ‘any ground’ but specifically: 
sex, race, colour, ethnic or social origin, genetic features, language, religion or belief, 
political or any other opinion, membership of a national minority, property, birth, 
disability, age or sexual orientation, as well as nationality discrimination. This is a 
broad range, some of which might come as a bit of a shock to some social media 
‘commentators’; there is currently barely recognition of the problem caused by 
misogynistic hate speech let alone that based on ‘genetic features’89 or property. 
Given that the next paragraph deals with hate speech that constitutes a criminal 
offence, it would seem that the content covered here need not be as serious as that 
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which would trigger such an offence – otherwise there is pure overlap between the 
provisions. Nonetheless the reference to incitement to hatred’ implies some 
threshold of severity before the content falls within Article 28b(1)(b). It is, however, 
unclear whether incitement to violence must be directed against a category of 
persons by reference to these protected characteristics or whether it includes any 
such incitement, eg incitement to riot to protest against austerity. It depends whether 
the aim of the provision is to protect the subject of the speech, or to protect society 
against the effect of having such speech available in terms of what that sort of 
speech does to social relations. 
 
The third category goes beyond Article 6(1)(b), which deals with public provocation 
to commit a terrorist offence. Article 28b(1)(c) requires protection for the general 
public from content ‘the dissemination of which constitutes an activity which is a 
criminal offence under Union law’. It specifies the offences of public provocation to 
commit a terrorist offence;90 child pornography91 and certain expressions of racism 
and xenophobia.92 Note that Member States are already obliged to seek removal of 
child pornography and incitement to terrorism.93 The cross referencing to these other 
measures mean that the definition of the offences is part of EU law, perhaps in an 
attempt to reduce difference in what is acceptable between Member States. This 
Europeanisation of meaning is defended on the grounds of the need to ensure 
coherence of EU law.94 It seems that these are just particular examples95 of types of 
problematic content that are definitely within scope of the provision. The question is 
what else might be covered? The phrase ‘Union law’ is ambiguous. It is unclear 
whether this phrase might cover only offences specified by EU secondary legislation, 
the areas in which the EU has specific competence to act in the criminal field,96 or 
indeed the activities of Member States when implementing EU law where criminal 
offences are not required but are permissible. Given that this is an obligation that the 
Member States are required to implement a need for legal certainty would point us to 
the direction of the first interpretation. Assuming the field is not fully harmonised, 
Member States can give wider protection – for example in relation to content that is 
criminal under national law but not by virtue of EU law requirements. 
 
As noted Article 9(1) is to be applicable in the context of VSPs. Article 9(1) has rules 
relating to identifiability of advertising, a ban on subliminal techniques, a list of 
prohibited content, a prohibition on certain products being advertised as well as rules 
relating to the advertising of alcoholic beverages and medicinal products. Article 
9(1)(g) elaborates on the prohibition on causing physical, mental or moral detriment 
to minors that adverts should not exhort minors to buy products. There is a 
distinction between the situation where the VSP provider ‘markets sells or arranges’ 
the commercial communication or not. If it does, the obligation is to comply with 
Article 9(1); if it does not, it should take appropriate measures (as for Art 28b(3)(a)–
(j)). Further, there is an exhortation to encourage co- and self-regulation in relation to 
HFSS foods – in line with the approach taken for AVM services. This is an attempt to 
limit the ability of brands to try to avoid limitations on advertising by taking it on-line; 
it may also make clear to ‘influencers’ that they are under regulatory control. As far 
as the UK is concerned, the ASA has attempted to take action in relation to social 
media but the effect of the Directive (if implemented post-Brexit) would be to move 
the scheme from self-regulation to coregulation or even direct regulation. 
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Article 28b(3) specifies the nature of ‘appropriate measures’, introducing a multi-way 
proportionality test, taking into account the interests of the provider (including its 
size) as well as those of the user. Note that there is no de minimis threshold – all 
VSP providers in the jurisdiction would be caught, making determination of scope 
especially significant. The provisions lists ten sorts of measures that a VSP provider 
could take. They include legal matters (applying the terms of service; providing 
complaints mechanisms) and technical measures (eg age verification and parental 
controls) as well as media literacy measures and to some extent parallel (albeit in 
more detail) the approach taken with regard to harmful content under Article 6a 
revised AVMSD. The measures are not focused on take-down but rather ensuring 
that the problematic content does not come to the attention of the protected groups 
of users; it is questionable whether this approach fully deals with the issue of criminal 
content. Member States may not impose a general monitoring obligation contrary to 
Article 15 of the e-Commerce Directive. It remains to be seen the extent to which 
video-sharing platforms may choose – of their own commercial choice – to impose 
such measures. 
 
While it seems that the VSP provider will be able to choose which measures to 
apply97 to its own service and how, the appropriateness of those measures is to be 
overseen by the national regulatory authority.98 Although there are aspirations 
towards co-regulation,99 self-regulation will not be an option. Although this is in line 
with a general enthusiasm for alternative forms of governance, the recitals show 
some scepticism about the effectiveness as [c]o-regulation should allow for the 
possibility of State intervention in the event of its objectives not being met’.100 Article 
4a, which deals with co-regulation, specifies conditions with which co-regulatory 
codes should comply. While Article 4a is located in the main section of the revised 
AVMSD dealing with media services, Article 4a(1) specifies that it applies to ‘the 
fields coordinated by this Directive’ which would seem to include the VSP provisions. 
So any co-regulatory codes should provide for effective enforcement and be 
monitored by the regulator.101 Note, however, that the Directive does envisage the 
possibility of pan-European codes being fostered in this area.102 While the objective 
of this provision could be merely to provide (regulatory) space for such an 
eventuality, this possibility seems in tension with Article 28b(4) and (5). 
 
By contrast to the Commission’s original proposal, Article 28b is a minimum 
harmonisation provision. Article 28b(6) specifies that Member States may impose 
‘more detailed or stricter measures than the measures referred to in paragraph 3’. 
Not only could Member States, specify how a tool could be adopted (eg requiring 
operators to contribute to a mediation system in relation to complaint resolution 
mechanisms103) add to the list of types of measures (for example, suggest new 
services to be subject to a safety audit before deployment), but could move to 
require operators to adopt certain tools (rather than having the choice of what to do 
themselves: eg make age verification mandatory). The requirements of Article 6a(1) 
may also affect choices in this context. The recitals also recognised the need to 
respect fundamental human rights: the right to respect for family life, the protection of 
personal data, freedom of expression, the freedom to conduct a business as well as 
the rights of the child.104 Given the complexity of this balancing, it would be difficult to 
predict the ‘right’ answer in any given situation. The specific reference to Article 
28b(3) would seem to be aimed at creating the link between this paragraph and the 
rest of Article 28b, avoiding overlap with the minimum harmonisation provision in 
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Article 4, which relates to AVM service providers only. A suggestion that the 
reference to paragraph 3 in some way limits the public interest grounds in paragraph 
1 seems untenable in the light of existing jurisprudence on minimum harmonisation 
which seems to extend ‘stricter’ to ‘wider’ as well as ‘higher’ standards.105 There is a 
blurring between the issue of minimum harmonisation and the question of whether 
the field is fully occupied.106 As noted above, it seems that in terms of public policy, 
the field is not fully harmonised.107 
 
A couple of other unconnected points should be noted. First, reflecting increased 
concerns about data (privacy), Article 28b(3) prohibits the use of personal data 
connected to the use of age verification systems and parental controls are not to be 
used for commercial purposes. The provision specifies that such purposes include 
direct marketing, profiling and behaviourally targeted advertising. This protection is 
limited to the data of minors (age unspecified) but is not limited to data directly 
provided by the user. The provision expressly includes personal data ‘otherwise 
generated’ by VSP operators. This is in addition to and independent of any obligation 
imposed by the GDPR though presumably a Member State is free to specify that its 
data protection supervisory body is the relevant national regulatory authority in this 
context. Article 30(1) revised AVMSD permits Member States to designate more 
than one regulatory authority for the purposes of the Directive; moreover, 
supervisory authorities for the purposes of the GDPR will satisfy the independence 
requirements for national regulators set down in the revised AVMSD.108 
 
Second, Article 28b(7) and (8) together provide that Member States are required to 
ensure that both (independent and impartial) out-of-court redress mechanisms and 
the right to go court are available to users – and it seems that is to be available in all 
cases. Although procedural rules are a matter of national law, they must not impinge 
on the effectiveness of EU law. Presumably rules which direct smaller claims to 
lower courts or which given specialist courts jurisdiction over some matters would not 
be affected. It is unclear, however, what ‘rights’ are in issue. Specifically, is this no 
more than saying that whatever rights you may have under national law, you can 
take to court, or is it specifying that users in some way have rights of enforcement in 
respect of matters identified in Article 28b(1) and (2)? 
 
Jurisdictional issues 
 
Article 28a deals with jurisdiction and regulatory competence. The starting point is 
the test of establishment so that a company is regulated in the Member State in 
which is established, according to Article 3 eCommerce Directive,109 establishment 
to be determined according to standard EU case law,110 rather than the specific rules 
established in relation to Audiovisual Media Service providers. Article 28a adds a 
gloss to the position in the e-Commerce Directive, trying to address non-
establishment in the EU111 with multiple subsidiaries. Even if the VSP provider is not 
established in the EU but another group member company is (eg a company selling 
advertising to provide revenue for the VSP provider). When there are multiple 
subsidiaries then the company which started continuous operations the longest ago 
in time in the same Member State determines jurisdiction for an out-of-EU VSP 
providers. Clearly these are complex rules so the Directive envisages that Member 
States should notify the Commission as to which VSP providers are established 
within their respective territories; the Commission then has the job of ironing out any 
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inconsistencies with the assistance of the European Regulators Group for 
Audiovisual Media Services (ERGA), a body which is re-established by the revised 
AVMSD.112 
 
Conclusions 
 
The question of boundaries of the AVMSD’s scope has long been complex. There 
are unanswered questions about the meaning of audiovisual media services. To 
these issues have been added further difficulties. While the limitation to video makes 
sense in the context of the rationale for the Directive as a whole, in the context of 
social media platforms it has little to commend it. In addition to the difficulties of 
applying legal definitions to changing technologies with varying and varied uses, the 
drafting in some instances is ambiguous – perhaps as a result of political 
compromise. There are many questions about how this Directive will relate to others 
in the field, and whether the development of new obligations will apply logically and 
coherently or, rather, differentially depending on small differences and/or ambiguities 
in wording. By comparison, the scope of the obligations to be imposed seem 
relatively clear. The question here – especially for the pan-EU companies – is the 
extent to which Member States will accept these minima, as well as the level of 
control Member States seek to exert. Perhaps the only certainty is that things will be 
changing somehow for companies that until recently have been seen to be beyond 
regulation. 
 
Professor Lorna Woods 
School of Law, University of Essex 
 
My thanks to Professor Twigg-Flesner, who commented on a draft of this article; 
errors remain my own. 
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